affect firms' incentives to invest in discovering new treatments. The elasticity of innovation is therefore a critical parameter to measure to evaluate the cost to society of price regulation. This question has no definitive answer in the literature, due to a number of estimation difficulties that we discuss below.
In this article, we contribute what we believe to be a valuable new estimate using several improvements to existing methods. First, we have data on the global revenues of all pharmaceutical products over an 11 -year period, as collected by pharmaceutical data provider, IMS. These detailed data allow us to calculate an excellent measure of innovation, namely, the number of new molecular entities released on the global market during our time period. Much of the existing literature measures intermediate outcomes in the innovation process, such as the number of new clinical trials or available regimens. Other literature focuses only on data from the United States.
Although the United States is the largest and most important national market for pharmaceutical products (with approximately 40% of demand), revenue in other nations is large and growing and serves as an important stimulus to innovation. Global revenue data have never, to our knowledge, been used in the literature to measure the response of innovation to market size yet are likely to be an important part of the incentive for firms.
Second, we employ instrumental variables to identify the relationship between innovation and market size. Although a large expected market size may stimulate new pharmaceutical innovation, it may also be the case that new pharmaceutical innovation creates sales and therefore market size. Innovation may also intensify competition between products and therefore reduces prices and margins. Innovation and sales may therefore move together for two distinct reasons: first, innovation creates sales of new products and affects the revenues on existing products, and second, sales stimulate innovation. We are interested in isolating a measure of the latter. Because of the likely existence of reverse causality, we instrument for market size in our estimation procedure using the worldwide number of deaths from diseases in the relevant therapeutic class, as well as country gross domestic product (GDP).
Our estimation technique is designed to obtain unbiased estimates from censored count data, as well as accommodating our instrumental variables strategy. We find, as theory predicts, that market size has a positive impact on global release of new molecular entities. Our elasticity estimate is substantially below unity; our preferred specification delivers an elasticity of innovation to market size of 0.25. This indicates that when a market increases in potential size by 10%, that stimulates a 2.5% increase in the number of treatments to serve that market. The previous literature generally finds elasticities for new drug products to be in the vicinity of 0.5, though there are exceptions, which we will discuss below. An elasticity below one could indicate the importance of competition in a market: as the market grows and more treatments enter, margins fall. An alternative explanation is that the fixed costs of innovation rise steeply with market size as the best ideas for treatments are sequentially exploited. It is also possible that the previous literature's use of US data meant that margins were systematically higher than in our data, and this affects estimated elasticities.
We follow up this estimate with regressions specific to a therapeutic class. There is significant variation between therapeutic classes, and the resulting average elasticity across classes is somewhat higher than that estimated by pooling classes.
Our conceptual framework is very simple. We assume that for-profit firms in the pharmaceutical industry choose innovation projects that they expect to be profitable. (Of course, governments and nonprofits may engage in, or sponsor, research driven by other goals.) Profits will be determined by costs and revenues, which in turn depend on market size. Expected market size is influenced by broadly three types of factors. First, there are factors such as demographic and rich foods and copious alcohol once available only to aristocrats, gout is staging a middlecomeback as American society grows older and heavier upon decades-old generic drugs that do not work well for everyo and Drug Administration has approved the first new gout drug in more than 40 years other examples spring to mind of research motivated primarily socioeconomic factors, such as research into cardiovascular dise the overweight and aging US population. These factors have the to the innovation process we are investigating, and therefore mea and GDP) will serve as our instruments.
Second, there are factors particular to the pharmaceutical and the degree of competition among firms and the strategies that firm win customers, that affect the profitability of innovation. As demo (1990, 1991) , increased entry increases price competition and dep difficult for the entrant to cover its fixed costs. Thus, larger increm recover the fixed costs of innovation as the number of entrants gro be magnified in the pharmaceutical industry by the intensity of co generic products. This will depend on the regulatory regime gover and also on cost-control pressures from managed care that incent and strong financial incentives to use generics will reduce the ex of the innovation. Margins on branded drugs due to the nature of institutions will also affect expected market size. Overall, factor the possibility of being endogenous to firms' choices of how to in Third, there are public policies, including policies toward inte drug safety and testing, pricing and reimbursement, and public f Studying the impact of such policy interventions is extremel these occur in circumstances that make them ideal natural expe Blume-Kohout and Sood, 2013, for illuminating examples focuse changes). It is quite possible, however, that policy changes may b rate of innovation itself. For these reasons, it is particularly useful t which are rarely under the influence of either government or in these exogenous changes in potential demand to estimate elastic think are clean measures of the causal impact of market size on in of the article examines the response of global new drug launches measured in revenues and instrumented with demographics.
Our identification strategy is as follows. If the cardiovascular ma to an aging population, firms will want to serve that demand. Fi concerning demand, the actions of rivals, and the timing of inno Therefore, there will be an increase in cardiovascular R&D before on average -we will see the release of new cardiovascular products o demand increase. Different therapeutic markets whose potential size due to demographic and income differences drive commensurate We can measure the elasticity of new products to expected marke our instruments are GDP and measures of population and mortality from disease in our sample of countries over time.
We begin in Section 2 by reviewing the existing literature that seeks to estimate the elasticity of innovation with respect to market size. In Section 3, we set out a conceptual framework for thinking about how innovation might be related to market size. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 presents the estimation methods. Section 6 gives our detailed results. Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature review ■ There is a substantial and varied literature on the topic of the elasticity of pharm innovation to expected market size. Some of the variation comes from the measures of i used. Grabowski and Vernon (2000) , for instance, use accounting data to estimate the det of R&D. If capital markets are imperfect and external funds are more expensive than cash flow, current revenue (market size) will have a positive impact on the amount of funded by the firm. Of course, if current market size is a proxy for future market size, th research may be responding to future sales opportunities also, but these two effects are dif disentangle. In a similar spirit, Giacotto, Santerre, and Vernon (2005) estimate that a 1% in the pharmaceutical price index leads to a 0.58% increase in R&D spending.
Another measure of innovation is the extent of clinical trials (see Yin, 2008 Yin, , 2009 ).
Kohout and Sood (2013) , hereafter BKS, exploit a policy change that creates a current a positive shock to market size. They find a strong response of clinical trials to the policy which is likely to be a combination of the contemporaneous cash-flow effect and the e investing more heavily in markets that are expected to be more profitable. Kyle and M (2012) estimate the elasticity of new clinical trials to market size across countries and a to the presence of patent protection.
Innovation has also been measured by numbers of relevant journal articles or diseas mens (Lichtenberg, 2005) . Similarly, there have been many different measures of potent size, including (negative) disability-adjusted life years (DALY) and mortality (Lichtenber Civan and Maloney, 2009 ). Lichtenberg (2005) finds a result of similar magnitude to tha cotto, Santerre, and Vernon (2005) : a 1% increase in the number of people with cancer .58% increase in chemotherapy regimens. Civan and Maloney (2009) find that a 1% in expected US entry price leads to .5% increase in the number of drugs in the drug deve pipeline. Lichtenberg (2005) finds that a 1% increase in DALY leads to a 1.3% increase drug launches. Acemoglu and Linn (2004) , hereafter AL, measure innovation using new drugs lau as we do, though they include generic drugs in much of their analysis. AL exploit varia 1970-2000 in the expenditure share of different US age cohorts for different therapeut For example, older people consume more cardiovascular drugs, but the number of old varies over time. They combine this with data on all US Federal Drug Administration approved new products and find that a 1% increase in contemporaneous expenditure sh to a 4% increase in the number of new drugs released on the market. This is a marked elasticity than found in the remainder of the literature.
As we do here, AL rely for identification on changes in the variables that exogenous market size. Some articles in the literature instead estimate directly the impact of policy The article by Finkelstein (2004) is an example of this approach, focused specifically vaccine market. She finds that a 1% increase in revenue leads to a 2.75% increase in the number of marketed vaccines. We cannot directly compare her elasticity to ours or that of AL because there are significant differences between vaccine and drug innovation and approval costs.
that measures what fraction of consumers of a particular drug or therapeutic class are elig for the program. They estimate that a 1% increase in this measure of market size yields a increase in early stage clinical trials.
The large variety of measures of potential market size and innovation are partly respon for the wide range of elasticity estimates. It is quite possible, for instance, that clinical respond fairly elastically to potential market size but that the proportion of clinical trials result in effective innovation may decline, leading to a less elastic response of effective innova Although our measures of new drug launches represent a more accurate measure of innova than do clinical trials (because the latter are an input rather than an output of the innov process), even our own measures are far from capturing what really matters for patients, whic
welfare.
An important reason for this is that there may be diminishing marginal health bene from innovation: the first radical innovation in a therapeutic class may produce much grea overall benefits than a drug that is just sufficiently different from it to be granted a paten also lack convincing measures of consumers' valuation or willingness to pay. Most patient insured and therefore do not face a marginal price when buying biopharmaceuticals. The b in most cases is either the nation, in the case of national health systems, or the large Phar Benefit Managers, in the case of private healthcare (United States), or some national system
Germany. An alternative approach to calculating welfare is to simply measure life years sav the new innovations and multiply by Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY), though compar data for many of these products is sparse. Our elasticities should therefore be interpreted on terms of new product numbers, and great care should be exercised before any welfare conclu are explicitly or implicitly drawn from them.
In addition, indirect arguments and evidence about market size effects can be found the theoretical literature on the links between price regulation and innovation (Brekke, Gr and Holmâs, 2009; Bardey, Bommier, and Jullien, 2010) , and in the empirical literature o relationships between regulation and spending (Danzón and Ketcham, 2004) , or drug launc (Danzón, Wang, and Wang, 2005) , as well as on the effects of regulation on R&D (Golec an Vernon, 2006; Vernon, 2005). 3. A framework for understanding the relevance of market size f innovation ■ We are interested in the effect of expected market size on innovation. The bulk of th empirical literature we have surveyed finds an elasticity substantially below one, which implie that innovation increases with market size, but less than proportionately so. That the relationshi should be increasing seems obvious: higher revenues in a market translate into higher profits, which attract additional entry from new drugs. However, it is not so obvious why entry should be less than proportionate. Many factors might play a role. One is decreasing margins as competitio intensifies. Another is that as more firms are attracted into a market, there is a greater chance th some of them duplicate each others' research efforts.
Relatedly, if there is a limited amount of "low-hanging fruit" to be plucked, then the mor research teams are seeking to enter a market, the lower will be the average productivity of each one. This point remains valid whether firms enter the market sequentially or simultaneously The low-hanging fruit need not necessarily be plucked first; all that matters is that if there ar fewer competitors, each one has a higher probability of finding the low-hanging fruit. Similarly if the average costs of clinical trials are increasing with market size (because it is necessary for the developers of a drug to do more to prove its additional clinical effectiveness) then average productivity may decline, regardless of whether this is a cross-sectional comparison or comparison over time.
Apart from AL, the previous empirical literature does not explicitly model the process of pharmaceutical competition, nor does it take a stand on the way in which the outcome of R&D competition might vary systematically in relation to market size. Here, we discuss the implications for this relationship of four main features of the pharmaceutical industry.
First, entry into the market for pharmaceutical profits is endogenous, driven by expected profits. Although this might seem a statement of the obvious, it highlights that the bulk of innovation in this industry is carried out by for-profit organizations that seek to earn revenue from their inventions.
Second, the scale of each research project is a choice variable of the firm -in other words, the fixed costs of entry into pharmaceutical markets are also endogenous. We can weakly sign the direction of this relationship, but not its functional form: the larger are the expected profits, the larger the scale of the research projects that are undertaken, and therefore the higher the costs.
Third, in many pharmaceutical markets there is competition between products that are at least partial substitutes. There is no "winner-take-all" process by which the best product captures all or almost all of the market, as in AL. In our data, it is typically the case that drugs are somewhat differentiated in their side effects and efficacy for different groups, and each makes positive sales over time, even in the presence of others in the same class.2
Fourth, there is evidence that the more products there are available for treatment of a particular clinical condition, the lower are the margins on each product. This phenomenon has been studied in the work of Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) , most notably, as a common feature of markets with fixed costs of entry. When margins decline with the number of entrants, each additional entrant requires commensurately more market size. Declining margins in the pharmaceutical industry occur both through discounting from the list price in the US market, and also via price regulation in other markets, such as those in Europe. In the latter markets, although there is considerable flexibility in the pricing of a first drug in this therapeutic class, subsequent drugs in each category ("therapeutic competitors") are often constrained by some form of reference pricing.
In principle, one might model a process of competition that captures these four features in a number of different ways. To fix ideas, we describe in the Appendix a simple version of the well-known circle model of horizontal product differentiation due to Salop (1979) , extended to incorporate vertical differentiation in the manner of Armstrong and Weeds (2007) . This captures the idea that different drugs within a certain category may exert some pricing pressure on one another without any one drug being unambiguously the best in its category and, therefore, taking all the revenue. This example is not intended to capture all the important features of pharmaceutical competition, but it captures the four features above and delivers a clear and intuitive prediction about the magnitude of the market size elasticity.3 It is, therefore, a helpful way to understand some of the underlying processes at work.
In this framework, when a firm considers whether it should invest, the firm forms expectations about revenues of the product over its lifetime, taking into account the productivity of the firm's own research programs and those of its rivals. We assume that firms have rational expectations of the number of rivals, shares, and prices.
Consider a circle of unit size, with a mass m of consumers uniformly distributed around the circle. We shall call this parameter m the "potential demand" and note that it is not the same as actual market size (measured by revenue) because the latter will depend on other conditions, including prices. Around this circle, N firms are located at equal intervals. Firm i is located at point i /N and incurs a fixed cost of investment to produce a drug of quality v¡ that it sells at price Pi' the number of firms N will be determined by the requirement that the marginal firm makes zero profits (we shall ignore integer problems). We initially model this fixed cost of investment as a constant exogenous cost K , then consider what happens when firms can invest to incr the quality of their drugs.
A consumer purchases at most one unit of the drug, and has an outside option yieldi utility normalized to zero, so will purchase uniquely if doing so yields weakly positive util The consumer's net utility is reduced by a linear transport cost t per unit of distance from drug purchased. To simplify the algebra, we assume marginal costs of production are zero, that there is market coverage -every consumer buys from at least one firm.4
As we show in the Appendix, the equilibrium value of N is given by the equation
Then, industry profits are zero and industry revenue is NK.
This yields a monotonie, strictly concave, relationship between potential demand m and the number of firms N (hence, of pharmaceutical products in the market), with N proportional to the square root of m , and an elasticity of N with respect to m of O.5.5
However, potential demand as we have defined it (and which is measured by the parameter m) is not the same as total revenue NK. m is proportional to the number of firms, and thus the elasticity of the number of firms with respect to m is one. The reason why the elasticity with respect to revenue is lower than that with respect to m is simply that revenue does not increase proportionately to m. Greater potential demand (i.e., higher m) attracts more firms and the increased competition lowers prices, thereby depressing revenue.
Next, we relax the assumption that fixed costs of entry are constant and exogenous but are instead related to vertical quality. Specifically, costs are K + y(v'~v) for an innovation of quality level v¡. An interior solution to the model requires that the cost y of improving quality is above a threshold given by y > m/2t.
Then, as we show in Appendix A, the equilibrium number of drugs is given by Wr("£> which implies, not surprisingly, that it increases more slowly in potential demand than when fixed costs are exogenous. In effect, increases in m induce entry but also raise fixed costs, thereby dampening the extent of entry in equilibrium beyond the dampening effect that comes from falling margins (see Sutton, 1991; Berry and Waldfogel, 2010) . We show that this implies that the equilibrium number of drugs is increasing in total revenue, but less than proportionately so.
This simple example provides a rationale for expecting that, in our empirical study, the number of innovations will be increasing in revenue, but less than proportionately. Similarly, to the extent that the estimated elasticity of the number of drugs with respect to expected total revenue is less than one, this must be because fixed costs of entry are rising as total market size rises. Whether this is because fixed costs are rising endogenously as firms invest in vertical product differentiation, or because the costs of entry for a drug of given quality are themselves rising, the estimation cannot tell us.6 4. Data description ■ We measure expected market size as the lifetime revenue accruing to the average product that is launched during a particular time window. Our measure of innovation is a count of new chemical entities (NCE) by therapeutic category launched anywhere in the 14 countries from which we have revenue data. Although they are lumpy because of their small numbers, we consider these products to be uncontroversially innovative. Drug approval agencies such as the FDA in the United States will approve new varieties and forms of existing medications (e.g., extended release, injectable vs. oral) and generic drugs; these do not fall into our definition of innovative. We limit our measure to products that have actually been marketed -and therefore survived all the steps in the innovative process from research through to marketing to take advantage of the information contained in those stages.
Our data set comes from IMS (Intercontinental Marketing Services) Health and includes all product sales in 14 countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Korea, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States) between 1997 and 2007 (except for China, where 1 997 and 1 998 are missing). The data report sales by value and unit volume for all pharmaceutical and biologic products. All values are deflated into 2007 US dollars using the US Consumer Price Index. The database reflects sales for all compounds in all 14 countries through retail pharmacies, hospitals, and Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), and includes characteristics of drugs such as their 4-digit Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC4) (607 different classes are reported), the main active ingredient of the drug (6216 different active ingredients are reported), the name of the firm producing the drug, whether it has been licensed, the patent start date, and the format of the drug (471 different formats are reported). Products in the same ATC4 by definition have the same indication and mechanism of action. Some other available and interesting drug characteristics are its brand type -licensed brand, original brand, other brand, or unbranded -and (when applicable) its patent expiry date -ranging from 1966 to 2030 in the available data, and which may differ from one country to another. We consider only ethical drugs and not over-the-counter (OTC) drugs. Quantities are given in standard units, one standard unit corresponding to the smallest common dose of a product form, as defined by IMS Health.
Overall, the initial data set has 6,163,465 observations (one per drug, country, year) but only 2,972,419 have strictly positive revenues and quantities (many observations correspond to years where the drug was not yet launched, or had disappeared in a given year and country, or to missing data on revenues or quantities). We keep only the 251,558 observations on branded drugs (i.e., those where the brand type is either a licensed brand or the original brand) to focus on revenues from patented pharmaceutical innovations. In addition, this restriction leads to dropping many other active ingredients (4503), formats (217), and ATC4 (217) that appear in generic form only.
After removing observations with zero revenue or quantity, some active ingredients and ATC4 classes disappear, but we still have 6091 different active ingredients and 606 ATC 4 categories. We dropped data from India, where brand type is always unavailable in the data ("patent N/A"). In total, our restrictions to current branded products with complete data leads us to drop 1083 active ingredients, 151 ATC4, 109 formats, and 30 patent years. Finally, because patents last 20 years, only the 68,219 observations that have their first patent date (throughout the different countries)
after 1977 are kept, to have at least one observation (revenue and quantity) in all countries where the drug was sold. We end up with a dataset where 630 active ingredients are present in 238 ATC4 classes. We also categorize drugs into coarser ATC categories. In the remaining data set, there are around 900 distinct on-patent products (i.e., products which are on patent at some time during the 1 1 years of the data). Some of these are essentially the same product in a different package; our procedure ensures that we treat these as a single product.
All sales and prices are at the manufacturer levels, as reported by IMS, and thus approximate actual prices, except to the extent of off-invoice discounts. We believe these off-invoice discounts are not a very large factor in our data. For the United States, Danzón and Furukawa (2006) compared the IMS prices with US average sales prices (ASP), which includes all discounts, as reported by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for the correspondi quarter, and found that on average, the IMS prices are similar to the ASPs. However, to the ext that unmeasured discounts exist, prices and revenues may be overestimated here.
We also use population and mortality data from the World Health Organization (WHO www. who.int/whosis/mort/download/en/index.html). We extracted population data for the st countries from available years since 1970. For all available country-years, we have populatio sex (M/F) and by age distribution (0, 1-4, 5-9, . . . , 70-74, 75+), except for Mexico in 197 where only total population by sex is available. Missing population information is reconstru through a regression in logs on a country-specific effect and a time trend. This amounts assuming that population evolves between available years of data at a country-specific an growth rate that changes over time at the same rate across countries.
Mortality data across years and countries are available per disease category, as classif using the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) classification. Of course, d
categories and drug categories (ATC classes) are different things, but one can attribute to e ATC class a "most likely" disease category in the ICD-10 classification. These are summar in Table 9 in the Appendix.
It is important to realize that the time series dimension of the demographic data conta little "news," at least from year to year. Population projections change only slowly over tim as do mortality risks, in any given demographic category. For this reason, the time periods constitute an "observation" in our empirical work are four years long. 5. Estimation method □ Heuristic description. The first step in estimating the elasticity of innovation is struction of an expected revenue measure. We do this by measuring market size ove various disease categories in our set of countries. Then, we measure how many new p introduced over time, again by category. We describe our empirical procedure below.
We exploit differences across brand revenue in different therapeutic categories and countries to estimate the potential market for an innovator in those different cou example, at launch, the brand will have a share of revenues in the therapeutic catego country. These revenues may change over time as the brand goes through its life cy begin to decline when the patent expires and the brand faces significant new competitio the entry of substitute drugs causes the brand's price and/or share to drop. These p vary across jurisdictions.
Price levels are determined by willingness to pay and the level of competition products. A nation's ability and willingness to pay for healthcare will depend on w nationally or privately financed and on the preferences of consumers and voters. In gene for biopharmaceuticals are higher in richer countries compared to poorer ones. Co conditions also vary by country according to the conduct of buyers, and these affect market size available to the innovator. The different income levels and competitive across different nations will affect the price levels observed in the data. In general, pric structures, entry, market exclusivity, and other features vary across countries. We will these because we can measure the average outcome, namely, revenue per drug, and firms anticipate these market conditions when making R&D decisions.
Our data allow us in principle to compute the global revenue obtained per innovation as observed in sales revenue in the data. Because in our actual data set, we observe only 1 1 years of revenue, we implement an imputation method to obtain a series of parameters for each ATC class that allows us to predict revenue for a drug over its entire life cycle, using the average life cycle within the class. We then use this estimate as the forecast of manufacturers making innovation decisions.
This process will generate some measurement error that could be expected to lead to a degree of attenuation bias on the coefficients of an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation procedure. Together with our concerns about possible reverse causality between innovation and revenues, this provides a strong argument for using an instrumental variables approach. We use as an instrument for total market revenue in each drug category a measure of potential demand (the equivalent of m in our theoretical model). We operationalize this idea by using population by age or gender by country, and GDP, and disease mortality in different countries; prevalence data, which in principle would be stronger instruments, are unfortunately not available for enough diseases in enough countries. We discuss the instrument set in greater detail below. However, as will be seen, the instruments we do use prove to be sufficiently strong for our purposes (i.e., sufficiently correlated with the endogenous variable).
For our instruments to be valid, innovation must not have any direct effect on our measure of potential market size, which requires that there are no changes in WHO-measured morbidity or mortality that are driven by the innovation in the short run. Indeed, innovation in class c at period t can affect future longevity and potential market size of later periods, as discussed by Cerda (2007) and Lichtenberg and Duflos (2008) , but not that of the current and subsequent periods corresponding to the patent life of the innovation. It seems reasonable to assume that class-specific innovations cannot affect population size in the short run because of competing risks in other disease categories that are likely to limit the immediate effect on mortality of an innovation.
□ Formal definition of market size. Let d denote an active ingredient (or chemical entity)
in a particular use class, hereafter known as a drug (all revenues correspond to revenues summed at the level of the chemical entity for different forms or brands with that chemical entity). We denote by R'd the revenue obtained for drug d at year t. Given that the IMS data are converted into current dollars, taking already account of each year's exchange rate, we measure these revenues by summing all countries' sales and transform them into constant US dollars of 2007 using the Consumer Price Index for inflation. Our average drug has positive revenues for about 20 years (although the patent only lasts for 20 years, the brand is not typically launched until years after filing, and brands typically earn profits after patent expiration in many markets). This leads us to write the total revenue obtained, thanks to the patent for drug d9 as i°+20 Rd = ¿ à' '" R'd> t=t o where 8 is the discount factor. We assume that these discounted revenues per drug determine investment decisions of firms.
We denote by C = {1, C) a partition of the set of therapeutic classes (the 1 -digit ATC classes). For a subset of drugs in set c e C that are launched in year /, we denote by W[ the sum of global revenues obtained in this segment c by all innovations of period t : k= E *<• I dec,tQ=t} We will call this the "period t innovation -class c" market size. As our model shows, we expect a positive relationship between market size and innovation.
In the empirics, this shows up as the relationship between the number of new chemical entities per class in period t ( N[ ) and the period t innovation size of class c (Wļ).
The arrival of new products on the market is stochastic due to uncertainties in the research process and in regulatory approval. Our measure of innovation in a single year will be lumpy from year to year and contains zeros. However, as discussed above, because there is little new news in demographics every year, we use periods of four years for ř, a procedure which smooths out our innovation measure N[. □ Imputation of revenues over drug life cycles. Because we observe only 1 1 years of data, we implement an imputation method to obtain a series of parameters for each ATC class that allows us to predict revenue for a drug over its entire life cycle, using the average life cycle within the class. We then use this estimate as the manufacturer's forecast of market size that it uses as its input into innovation decisions.
For a given drug d, the data do not allow us to observe all the R'd for years t°, t° + 1, . . ., t° + 19. As we want to take into account the life cycle of drugs, we compute the average evolution of revenues of new chemical entities within a class c between patent age r and r H-1 as the ratio between patent age r and r + 1 of average revenue (across active ingredients) for all drugs of a given drug category c. Defining T(c) as the set of drugs in class c, we can also use the following
Assuming that the expected revenue of a drug of using these kTc, we can estimate the revenue at observed, we estimate it with R¿+T+i = yc{d)R revenues of any drug on the market during the 6. Empirical results ■ We will consider two levels of ATC classes, C ATC classes) considered will be C'. A class denot finer classification. With the previous notatio entity in class c and "born" during patent peri 2007 US dollars and the discount factor used is 8 = .95. □ Descriptive statistics. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics by ATC class on the number of innovations and life cycle revenues per ATC class at level 1. Table 2 shows the same statistics as Table 1 , but using the 2-digit ATC classification. Figure 1 presents the same data as Table 1, but averaged not over ATC class but according to the number of new chemical entities. This shows a broad descriptive relationship between market size and the number of new chemical entities. On average, the total revenue per ATC class seems to be broadly increasing with the number of innovations except when the number of innovations is the largest. This result holds on aggregate and does not account for the heterogeneity of revenues and innovations across categories of ATC classes.
Using a definition of X.1 that gives weights to active ingredients proportional to their revenue in the class, we have V n/°+r + l = deUc) ' -which leads to similar results.
Lev,*?" 1977-1980, 1981-1984, 1985-1988 1993-1996, 1997-2000, 2001-2004, 2005-2007. We use several specifications to estimate the elasticity of innovation with res size. First, we estimate the following model: ln^=aln^ + yc + i,+^, which relates the number of innovations (number of NCEs) patented in period t in each class the total revenue provided by sales of all drugs (on patent and licensed) in the class during th duration of the patents issued at t.
In this reduced form model, a can be interpreted as the elasticity of innovation to marke size, yc is a fixed unobserved effect specific to the ATC class c, 8t is a common unobserved per effect, and eĻ an unobserved random shock on the innovation outcome.
Assuming all right-hand side variables are exogenous means that E (e^l In Wlc, Yc, 8t) = 0.
We first estimate such a model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Then we employ tw stage least squares (2SLS), because of the likelihood of measurement error in the construction the revenue measures, and to deal with the possibility of reverse causality between innovation market size. Our instrumental variables are demographic and economic: population and mortal by disease in different countries, and GDP. To be valid instruments, demographics and dise mortality must be correlated with market size, and as we shall see, the instruments easily pa F-tests in the first stage of the estimation. Second, innovation, or launch of new products, mu not directly cause changes in demographics or disease mortality. We can imagine that at a ver fine level of categorization, this could be a problem. For example, a pill for Asperger's syndrom (mild autism) might well increase diagnoses of Asperger's and therefore the recorded incidenc of autism. However, the WHO data we use are much coarser: for example, how many people died of cardiovascular diseases in period t. We do not think the therapies available for differe cardiovascular diseases affect this measurement.
For this reason, we use male, female, and "more than 50 years old" population variables, as well as GDP, and the number of deaths of males and females for the disease categories that each drug class (ATC class) can be considered to target. These instruments vary across periods and drug classes. They are interacted with dummy variables for 1 -digit ATC classes or 2-digit ATC classes, depending on the case.
For the population measures, we compute the size of the population in countries where drugs of each ATC class are sold and sum this over countries and years for the duration of the patent.
This population is denoted Pļ. This instrument varies not only over time but also across ATC classes. We use a similar definition for male or female population, and for the "over 50 years old" population. Table 3 details the different sets of instruments used in the regressions below. As will be seen, these sets of instruments satisfy the different usual tests of exclusion (Sargan of overidentifying restrictions) and of significance in the first stage (F-test of joint signifi of excluded instrumental variables [IVs] in the first-stage regression). In our empirical w set A will be used for regressions at the ATC-1 level and B, C, or D for regressions a ATC-2 level.
Recall that the number of innovations N'c that can be observed on each market is censored at zero, and that W[ is unobserved when there are zero innovations. We have a fundamental problem of unobserved potential market size of any innovation that did not happen and therefore need a truncated regression model. In particular, it could be that e[ is not mean independent of all right-hand side variables because of the truncation of the model when N'c = 0.
With some parametric assumptions on sĻ one can estimate the model taking into account the truncation (Lewbel and Linton, 2002; Chen, 20 10) .8 For example, as we are dealing with count data, we can assume a Poisson distribution for the number of innovations, such that P(Ar=") = e'"'<-n' f>*', In this case, we take into account the endogeneity of W[ using a control function approach. As suggested by Wooldridge (2002) and Blundell and Powell (2003) , this technique is useful for nonlinear models. It amounts to performing a first-stage regression of the endogenous variables on all exogenous variables and excluded instruments and then using residuals and polynomials of these residuals as additional "control" variables in the main regression (here, the zero-truncated Poisson). The results of these first-stage regressions are shown in Appendix B. They show that the excluded instruments are highly statistically significant (as confirmed also by the joint F-test shown at the bottom of the tables). In the case of the control function approaches, we used sets of instruments A for analysis of N[ and D for NĻ but results are similar with other sets of instruments. In the case of ATC-1 level regressions, instrumental variables A proved satisfactory and consist in male and female populations of corresponding countries, male and female deaths of corresponding ATC-1 class and countries. In the case of ATC-2 level regressions, instrumental variables B, C, or D proved satisfactory and consist different male or female demographic variables interacted with ATC-1 or ATC-2 dummies.
In all tables reported here, standard errors are clustered at the class level and shown in parentheses. In the case of control function approaches, standard errors are computed using the bootstrap with 1000 replications. Although dummy variables <5, for time periods are not shown to conserve space, they are always significant. Tables 4 and 5 show the results of estimating the linear model for the 1 -digit and 2-digit ATC categories, respectively. Tables 6 and 7 show the corresponding results of the estimation of the count models. In each case, we show results with and without instrumenting for potential market size. All standard errors are clustered at the ATC-1 level.
The specifications yield a range of elasticities between 3% and 32%, meaning that increasing market size by 1% yields an increase in the number of new products of 0.03% to 0.32%.
There is no clear relationship between the elasticity and the type of specification (linear vs.
count, one-stage vs. two-stage) or the instrument set. Overall, our preferred specification among these is equation (12), which yields an elasticity of 10.4%, with a ř-ratio of around 7, which gives the elasticity a confidence interval of around 7.5% to 14.5%.9 It takes into account the truncated nature of the data and the need to use instrumental variables, and it uses the finer set of instruments in which the demographic variables are interacted with 2-digit therapeutic categories, thus taking account of the fact that different demographic profiles generate different market sizes in the various treatment categories. It uses the finer 2-digit disease classification for the dependent variable, which we prefer because we understand it is relatively rare for drugs in one ATC-2 category to be discovered while searching for therapies in a different ATC-2 category.
However, for this very reason, the assumption that the elasticity is the same across disease categories may not be realistic, because the extent to which the industry has had low-hanging Given the size of the elasticity, we can also compute how much additional revenue in a given drug category is needed to obtain one additional innovation as the inverse of the elasticity times the average revenue per innovation observed on the market (because d Wc = (fļ^r)-1 ^). Table 8 reports the estimated elasticities by ATC class. We find higher elasticities on average than in the model with the elasticity constrained to be constant across disease categories, though they remain within the range of elasticities found under previous specifications. The average across all categories is an elasticity of 23.1%.
We see that the elasticities of innovation vary by ATC class, and that the average life cycle discounted market size increase needed on average to obtain one additional NCE also varies across classes. For comparison, we estimate the log-linear model with ATC-1 specific elasticities (results G XIV N00-N99 Diseases of the genitourinary system H IV E00-E90 Endocrine, nutritional, and metabolic diseases J I A00-B99 Certain infectious and parasitic diseases L II C00-D48 Neoplasms M XIII M00-M99 Diseases of musculoskeletal system and connective tissue N 1 , N2, N3 VI G00-G99 Diseases of the nervous system N4, N5, N6, N7 V F00-F99 Mental and behavioral disorders P I A00-B99 Certain infectious and parasitic diseases R X J00-J99 Diseases of the respiratory system 51 VII H00-H59 Diseases of the eye and adnexa 52 VIII H60-H95 Diseases of the ear and mastoid process costs of production, distribution, and marketing. Industry sources have of revenue is a reasonable guess at the size of these costs. This suggests need to cover costs of around $1.6 to $2 billion to yield a return to the lower than our estimated market size increase of $2.5 billion needed to induce an additional innovation. Our elasticity estimate therefore seems broadly plausible in the light of what is known from accounting data.
Comparing our elasticities to others in the literature is difficult, if only because the dependent variable changes across research designs from new drugs, to new cancer regimens, to new clinical trials, to journal articles. However, we and AL use new product launch as a measure of innovation.
Recall that AL estimate for each 1% increase in revenue, the number of new products increases by 4%, which is over an order of magnitude larger than our estimate (and of most others in the literature). There are significant empirical differences in data sets, methods, and time periods that underlie these two different results.10
This article has used new data and methods to quantify the relationship between market size and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. We have estimated the elasticity of innovation (as measured by the number of new chemical entities appearing on the market for a given disease class) to the expected market size, which is predictable by the potential demand as represented by the willingness of sufferers from diseases in a class (and others acting on their behalf, such as insurers or governments) to spend on their treatment. We have found significant positive elasticities with a point estimate under our preferred specification of 23.1%. This suggests that at the mean market size, an additional $2.5 billion is required in additional revenue to induce the invention of one additional new chemical entity, which appears a reasonable order of magnitude because estimates of the true economic cost of developing a new chemical entity are around $800 million to $1 billion, and marketing and related costs represent some 50% of revenue. An elasticity substantially below one is also plausible in the light of other evidence that innovation in pharmaceuticals is becoming more difficult and expensive over time, and is compatible both with the hypothesis that the costs of regulatory approval are rising and the hypothesis that the industry is running out of "low hanging fruit."
10 Though it is hard to know the impact of these methodological differences, an elasticity as large as four appears to imply that marginal costs of innovation are falling as more innovation takes place, which does not seem a plausible description of the pharmaceutical industry in the early 21st century.
Our results are robust to a number of specification choices. However, the availability of for more years would undoubtedly help to refine our estimates, and we leave this as a subjec future research. To verify the conditions under which this is consistent with market coverage, note that substituting (A2) into (Al) implies that the indifferent consumer c has utility level u< = Vi~w which, for market coverage with exogenous quality implies, by substitution of (A3), that
Appendix
[9 ĪK Vi -V 2¡»T' So, we can conclude that, if quality is exogenous and above some threshold (>/?£) that is increasing in the extent of product differentiation ( t ) and in fixed entry costs (K), and decreasing in potential demand (m), then the number of drugs in the market increases as the square root of potential demand.
To conclude the analysis of the case with exogenous quality, we note that if the market were not fully covered, prices would be given by the expression Vi P' ~ ~2' Then, the profit function becomes n , = ^f 4 = K, 4 which implies that fixed costs of entry are either too high so that no entry occurs, or low enough so that entry occurs until it exhausts all available opportunities. For constant fixed cost, this suggests that market coverage is the only interesting case to study For fixed costs that vary by potential demand, entry will be determined entirely by the shape of the cost function: any increase in m will simply raise the profit threshold for entry, and all firms with fixed costs below the new higher threshold will enter.
In studying endogenous quality, we therefore look only at the case of full market coverage. Then, the profit function can be written as follows:
(' 2v¡ -v,_i -«,■+, ~(2p, ,-pi-i-Pi+,) ' It, , y(vi -vf' n, = m^-(' + where K + y(vi~v)2 is the cost of innovating with an innovation of quality level vt .
This differs from the profit function when quality is exogenous only in that the fixed is quadratic in the cost of increasing quality above a certain base level v.
Assume that firms first choose product quality as part of their R&D decisions, the are fixed. When choosing their R&D decisions, they take the R&D decisions of other fi their entry decisions, so N is taken as given by firms choosing quality.
In solving for prices, we can no longer presume equilibrium is symmetric. We assum is symmetric among firms other than firm /. Writing pj = pi+' = pt-' and analogously conditions with respect to p¡ and substituting in the analogous first-order conditions f Then, we also have the equilibrium quality of products, which is 1 I mK v¡ = v + -/ YV-fy which is increasing in K , decreasing in y,t.
We can then differentiate N* with respect to m to yield: d_N_ _ t-a which is strictly positive so long as y > m jit.
With endogenous quality, we no longer find a unit elasticity of the number of firms (or drugs) N* with respect to total revenue. In this case, total market revenue R* is endogenous and given as a function of endogenous N* by which is a (/-shaped function of N* with a minimum at It is useful to note that as y -* oo, it converges to the expression for revenue under exogenous fixed costs.
However, because for a real solution for N it is necessary that y > g, R*(N*, m) is increasing in N at the optimal N* because
This means that the relationship between N* and R* is increasing for a given m. Appendix B N-N-N', N'c, N 
